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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular 
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) 
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars 
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array 
of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part 
of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by 
world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles, 
and books. Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving 
and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to 
meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. 
Mr. Norman Nigh is the author of this case study, which focuses 
on the use of Human Terrain Teams (HTT) in Afghanistan. The Human 
Terrain System (HTS) is an innovative military intelligence support 
program used by the US Army that employs civilian social scientists with 
backgrounds in linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and regional studies 
to provide military commanders with clearer insights into the local 
population and culture in the regions in which they are deployed.  
Mr. Nigh relies on his extensive experience as a Human Terrain 
Team Advisor to create an insightful analysis of the opportunities and 
challenges associated with the use of the Human Terrain System in 
Afghanistan. This case study was created for three key purposes: first, to 
explore how HTT advisors help military commanders enhance operational 
effectiveness in the battlespace; second, to examine the specific strengths 
and limitations associated with the use of civilian social scientists in the 
battlefield environment; and third, to help military and civilian leaders be 
better prepared to use Human Terrain Teams more effectively in future 
engagements. 
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We believe Mr. Nigh has presented a balanced treatment of the 
subject matter. Balance, however, does not mean that the case study will 
be uncontroversial. In fact, Nigh’s analysis contains some rather blunt 
appraisals of many actors in this conflict, including both Human Terrain 
Teams and the US Army. The point is to shed light on the value of the 
program and how the US military might exploit the Human Terrain 
System more effectively in the future. 
This case study was submitted in October 2011 and the vignettes 
are from 2009-2010. Currently under USA TRADOC, the HTT program 
continues to grow and develop, but this case takes a snapshot of the 
program—at a point where both operators and HTT analysts were figuring 
out its utility and limitations—in order to give the reader insight into the 
challenges and dilemmas they faced on the ground.  
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case study. 
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author 
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to 
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible 
for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in 
all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide 
variety of topics, including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as 
well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the 
battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and 
adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet 
the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that 
real people faced in high-pressure situations. Some of the most 
challenging questions asked in the case are: what would you do, what are 
your rules of engagement and moral and ethical constraints, and what 
would be the operational and strategic consequences of your decisions?  
 





Norman Nigh is a graduate of The George Washington University (BA, 
Political Science), Yale University (MA, Religious Studies) and 
Vanderbilt University (MA, Economics). He has lived in the Middle East 
and Asia, focusing his efforts on Iraq (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM), 
Afghanistan (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM) and China (Tibet). 
Mr. Nigh’s experience as a US government employee includes post-
conflict reconstruction, conflict mediation, and counterinsurgency. He has 
worked extensively with Canadian and French forces, as well as with 
Afghan National Army and Army Special Operations Forces.  
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I. Introduction: Counterinsurgency — Theory vs. Reality 
 
“Yeah, I’m all about hearts and minds, two shots in the heart and one in 
the head, now that’s COIN,” jokingly remarked a young US Marine Corps 
captain while flipping through FM 3-24, the official US Army/Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The Marine captain was one of 
22 US military and civilian personnel that had come together in a 
makeshift conference room at Forward Operating Base Shank in 
Afghanistan’s Logar Province to attend General Stanley McChrystal’s 
“COIN Academy.”  
The battle-hardened group of men and women, made up of soldiers 
from the Army and the Marines Corps, as well as civilians from various 
government agencies, represented the frontline of counterinsurgency 
warfare (COIN) in Afghanistan. They had been called to the COIN 
Academy because commanders realized that the fate of Operation 
Enduring Freedom rested on the ability of operators to implement COIN 
doctrine in the field.  
Despite the initiative to implement COIN objectives at the tactical 
level, an atmosphere of confusion at the operational level persists. In large 
part, a decade-long conflict, with revolving strategies, ambiguous 
objectives, and a clandestine enemy, has fueled frustration, anger, and 
resentment among military forces:  
 
The people who wrote this don’t understand what it’s like 
on the ground. It sounds good on paper and stuff like this 
gets people promoted but at the end of the day it’s our lives 
they are playing with. I am told to secure a village, get to 
know the people, shake hands, take pictures with locals and 
tell my superiors about what the hell is going on – what 
bull****.… I have no idea who these people are, what they 
want, or how to communicate with them. The locals accuse 
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me of peeping on their wives, disrespecting their culture 
and killing their friends. When we’re not getting shot at or 
finding IEDs, local kids throw rocks at my guys and the 
locals demand money. Yet I am told to exhibit tactical 
patience and focus on the big picture. The situation is 
f***ed.1  
 
The above snapshot captures the situation faced by many operators 
on the ground in Afghanistan. Talk of COIN is everywhere, especially on 
the lips of senior military and civilian leadership. In practice, COIN 
presents complex operational challenges. To implement a COIN strategy 
successfully, a company or platoon must fully understand the people with 
whom it is dealing. It must then use that knowledge of local customs and 
traditions to develop a COIN-centric strategy unique to the area. Many 
soldiers in Afghanistan, however, have not studied the region’s history or 
its tribal languages, and consequently struggle to interact with local 
populations. Moreover, the generic COIN checklists and principles handed 
down from headquarters are rarely applicable to specific situations, and 
only exacerbate the challenges of implementing counterinsurgency 
strategies.  
In 2007, after nearly six years of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
military strategists began devising alternatives to the enemy centric model 
of warfare. During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), policy makers did not anticipate 
prolonged conflicts. In each case, when traditional, kinetic methods were 
applied, insurgents went “all quiet” – a strategic response that U.S. 
planners incorrectly interpreted as a sign of imminent victory. But 
insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan remerged, engaging American and 
NATO forces in protracted military campaigns. Coalition involvement in 
these conflicts has proven costly; NATO and the U.S. have not only 
                                                          
1 Anonymous, February 18, 2010  
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exhausted their resources, but – because of continued incidents of 
collateral damage – have continued to alienate local populations. As a 
result, the Coalition has actually furthered the objectives of Al Qaida and 
its affiliates.  
Recognizing this, Gen. Petraeus, Gen. McChrystal, and others 
implemented a stronger counterinsurgency model, one explicitly focused 
on securing the population as its primary goal. This new emphasis on 
COIN required military operators and commanders to become more 
knowledgeable about the indigenous population. In order to protect and 
gain the trust of the people, local concerns, attitudes, and needs were given 
precedence. As Gen. Petraeus noted, “You have to understand not just 
what we call the military terrain…the high ground and low ground. It’s 
about understanding the human terrain, really understanding it.”2  
One of the greatest challenges US and NATO forces have faced in 
recent COIN operations is comprehending and overcoming their enemy’s 
antiquated warfare culture. “Afghan social, political, economic, and 
cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF [International 
Security Assistance Force] does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics 
in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent 
officials, power brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan 
population. A focus by ISAF intelligence on kinetic targeting and a failure 
to bring together what is known about the political and social realm have 
hindered ISAF’s comprehension of critical aspects of Afghan society.”3 In 
2005 the Department of Defense released hundreds of millions of dollars 
to fund new programs that would bring this alternative COIN perspective 
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Programs were designed to help 
operators in the field better understand the local culture and develop 
stronger relationships with the population while also providing senior 
leadership with expert advice. Ultimately, these new programs intended to 
                                                          
2 Babak Dehghanpisheh , “Scions of the Surge,” Newsweek, March 2008. 
3 Robert Dreyfuss, “Blind in Afghanistan,” The Nation, January 2010. 
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transform what General McChrystal has called “a conventional force that 
is poorly configured for COIN.”4 
Implementing the newly revised COIN doctrine successfully 
required academics and subject matter experts (SMEs). Recognizing that 
senior leadership depends on operators to interpret a very complex and 
paradoxical battle space, US Army leadership created Human Terrain 
Systems (HTS), teams of social scientists who seek to "recruit, train, 
deploy, and support an embedded operationally focused socio-cultural 
capability; conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research and 
analysis; develop and maintain a socio-cultural knowledge base, in order 
to enable operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, 
and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge."5 This 
socio-cultural information allows NATO forces to compete with 
insurgents for “hearts and minds”; groups such as Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban are no longer the only actors who can use knowledge of local 
cultural and religious practices to their advantage. 
The fundamental mission behind the creation of HTS was to 
embed SMEs and individuals with formal training in the social sciences 
with operators in the field. HTS personnel used their knowledge of 
linguistics, psychology, anthropology, economics, history, sociology, and 
political science to help decipher and articulate characteristics of the social 
terrain to command. The idea was to support operators in the field by 
developing COIN principles appropriate for specific areas of operation 
(AO), and to aid senior leadership by providing a more nuanced 
articulation of the battle-space – a perspective that would serve as a 
counterweight to the traditional U.S. view of war. As Sun Tzu observed, 
                                                          
4 David B. Edwards, “Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System,” Small Wars Journal, 
December 2010. 
5 CPT Nathan Finney, “Human Terrain Team Handbook,” TRADOC G2, 2008. 
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“So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you can 
win a hundred battles without a single loss.”6  
One of the greatest challenges HTS confronted was making their 
advisory support applicable to direct and indirect warfighters alike. 
Initially, HTS doctrine was created with the Special Operations Force 
(SOF) community in mind. As SOF assignments shifted to kill/capture 
missions, however, and as the interagency responsibilities of SOF 
increased, they had less and less time to engage non-kinetically with the 
population. “While some of the Special Forces missions are centered on 
training of allied forces, often that line is blurred. In some cases, ‘training’ 
is used as a cover for unilateral, direct action. It's often done under the 
auspices of training so that they can go anywhere. It's brilliant. It is 
essentially what we did in the ‘60s," says a Special Forces source.7 As a 
result, command began placing more and more responsibility on 
conventional forces to engage the population, train indigenous forces, and 
promote stability through the use of development funds. Thus, the mission 
of HTS teams evolved, and embedded personnel refocused their efforts on 
supporting conventional units and their role in the irregular warfare battle 
space.  
In irregular warfare, COIN exists on the chalk line between direct 
and indirect action.8 Relying on one method exclusively creates an 
                                                          
6 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
7 Jeremy Scahill, “Obama’s Expanding Covert Wars,” The Nation, 2009. 
8 Direct: In the context of military special operations, direct action (DA) consists of 
“Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special 
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ 
specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 
designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level 
of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and 
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.” -US Department of Defense, Joint 
Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(2007-07-12). Indirect: Military action in support of political, economic, and 
informational initiatives which are so dominant that they shape the form of the military 
action; military action through support of another party, such as security assistance to 
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operational vacuum easily exploited by the enemy. The problem with 
employing both strategies jointly, however, is that direct and indirect 
actors often undermine each other’s efforts. This zero-sum relationship is 
based on the premise that direct and indirect action compete for control of 
the battle space. When both methods are implemented without 
coordination, the populace receives a distorted – and often competing – 
message. In indirect action, the population is told that it is the priority, that 
efforts will be focused on reconstruction, peace building, and the 
elimination of the insurgency. In direct action, the population is often 
involved in collateral damage or marginalized during the targeting of 
insurgents. Although both actions play a vital role in counterinsurgency, 
they must be coordinated to achieve a cohesive result. As former 
Commander of US SOCOM, Admiral Olson, stated in 2009, “While the 
direct approach is mostly decisive in its impact, it also buys the time for 
the indirect approach to have its desired effect.”9  
To conduct indirect and direct action, operators must be able to 
explain the ground-level complexity to commanders and policy makers. 
This is not an easy task. It requires a thorough understanding of the human 
terrain, strong relationships with local allies, a detailed understanding of 
localized conflict triggers, and a deep respect for the indigenous people. 
To help direct and indirect operators engage noncombatants more 
successfully, US policy makers and military strategists have developed 
engagement programs focused on the population, such as HTS, to aid 
operators in the field. These programs aim to help operators contextualize 
the population, develop a deeper understanding of their actions, and better 
articulate characteristics of the battle-space to commanders and policy 
makers. To better understand how programs such as HTS work to support 
                                                                                                                                                
friendly foreign armed forces. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020gl.htm 
9 Admiral Eric T. Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” The Journal of 
International Security Affairs 16 (2009). 
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direct and indirect action, it is important to discuss the roles of 
conventional and irregular warfare in counterinsurgency operations.  
Historically, military might has been defined by the strength of 
conventional forces. Metrics such as the number of soldiers, units of 
military equipment, and volume of ordnance, along with a military’s level 
of technological sophistication, are often used as indicators of capacity 
and effectiveness. In symmetrical warfare, these capabilities are 
paramount to success. In irregular conflicts, however, one needs to look 
deeper to understand how – or even if – conventional tactics are effective. 
By conducting operations in accordance with the laws of a host country, 
for instance, conventional forces can give credibility to governments 
whose legitimacy is in question. On the other hand, the use of direct action 
allows conventional forces to isolate and terminate threats. Merely 
carrying arms and conducting operations openly can provide an interim 
system of order, temporarily stabilizing regions that had been corrupted by 
insurgency. In Operation Phantom Fury, for example, American and 
British forces dislodged insurgents from Fallujah, depriving them of their 
last stronghold in Iraq. While this kind of conventional approach does 
usually prove necessary, its effects are mostly short-term.  
The ultimate goal in creating HTS was to supplement military and 
civilian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan by providing a subject matter 
capability and helping to interpret social grievances and the role they play 
in conflict. By identifying the factors leading to violence, Human Terrain 
Teams (HTT) help field operators, commanders, and policy officials better 
understand the civilian population. Each program assists with strategy 
implementation, consensus building, and casualty reduction. Secondary 
efforts focus on leveraging community resources and gradually reducing 
US and NATO expenditures – measures that will help achieve the end 
goal of Afghan self-sufficiency. Further, HTS’s capability is aimed at 
helping military and civilian leadership map out a nexus of second- and 
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third-order effects, an activity that will ultimately increase operational 
efficiency and maintain combat strength.  
Sections I and II of this case study explore how HTT advisors can 
aid operators and military/civilian leadership in the irregular warfare 
battle-space. The sections begin with a community profile that identifies 
the social, cultural, economic, and political issues affecting a specific local 
environment. This is followed by an outline of NATO strategies and an 
analysis of their effects on both the population and the insurgency. A net 
social science assessment is presented in Section III, which examines the 
effects of COIN activities on operations and analyzes alternative courses 
of action. Finally, Section IV discusses matters related to the 
implementation of social science methodologies – including their 
limitations in the field – and a sample operational schedule is presented in 
Section V. Ultimately, this case study aims to serve as a resource for 
operators utilizing counterinsurgency advisory support and is intended to 




Discussion Questions  
1. COIN doctrine vs. COIN application: Can doctrine be applied 
despite an unwilling population? 
2. Can non-military entities be effective in a non-permissive 
environment? Do they present challenges, liabilities, support, or 
guidance?  
3. Do academics and subject matter experts have a place on the 
battlefield? Can soldiers be taught to implement research and 
analytical techniques that experts could provide? If yes, can 
soldiers overcome groupthink or institutional biases that could 
distort their findings? 
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4. In irregular warfare, do direct and indirect operators need 
COIN/SME advisors? Is one operator better suited over another to 
implement COIN?  
5. Can indirect or direct action undermine COIN application?  
6. What limitations do operators have in the field when it comes to 
developing relationships with locals, understanding their culture, 
and mitigating conflict with non-kinetic actors? 
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The young Canadian lieutenant glared furiously into the eyes of village 
leader “Haji Malma.”10 “I know who you are, you piece of ****. You are 
the man responsible for the death of my friends and I’m not going to let 
that go. I am going to take Nakhonay back from you and we are never 
going to give up!”  
Malma, a stoic village elder, known Taliban judge, and suspected 
architect of countless Canadian deaths, smiled unapologetically at the 15 
                                                          
10 Name has been changed. 
Figure 1: Nakhonay 
Map 1 Nakhonay 
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well-armed Canadian troops staring him down. There was nothing the 
Canadians could do, and Malma knew it. 
 Like most sophisticated Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, Malma 
was taking advantage of McChrystal’s COIN war. On the surface, he 
appeared to be a benign village elder, interested only in the well-being of 
the people of Nakhonay. This cover gave him credibility in the community 
and with the wider NATO public. He often sought “development funds” 
from aid organizations and NATO troops.  
Beneath the surface, however, Malma was a key Pakistani-
educated Al-Qaida supporter who controlled one of the most dangerous 
and strategically important areas in Kandahar. “No progress happens 
because Haji Malma stop-drops it all,” the lieutenant argued as she briefed 
Milner and Lt.-Gen. Peter Devlin, Canada’s Chief of Land Staff. “But 
other than him, the other village elders have actually supported us.”11  
The problem facing this Canadian platoon – the mendacity of local 
Afghan leadership – was endemic throughout Afghanistan. On the surface, 
village elders, mullahs, and business owners appear to cooperate with 
NATO forces. But behind the scenes these individuals plotted frontline 
attacks and orchestrated targeted killings. NATO troops know that Afghan 
leaders are involved in these actions, yet they are required to stand-down. 
Frustration and seething anger can result, as soldiers are unable to realize 
justice for the friends they’ve lost. When they take root, these heightened 
emotions often blur an operator’s ability to understand the population and 
wage an effective COIN war.  
 Nakhonay, located in Panjwayii district, is considered one of the 
most volatile areas in Afghanistan. According to a recent newspaper 
article, “While much of Panjwaii has stabilized in recent months due to a 
surge of American and Afghan troops, Nakhonay has remained something 
of an exception. Over the years, it's been a notorious trouble spot, where at 
                                                          
11 Paul Watson, “Afghanistan: Where Success Can Bring Failure,” The Star (2010). 
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least seven Canadian soldiers have died since 2009.”12 From Alexander 
the Great’s arrival in the region in 300 BC to Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Nakhonay has been a center of tribal, religious, economic, and 
logistical conflict. Its proximity to Kandahar, the Argandab River (the 
largest river in southern Afghanistan), Pakistan, and major transportation 
lines (including the export route for opium from Helmand), as well as its 
strategic position regarding southern Asia and the Middle East, has made 
it a hotly contested area for over a thousand years. Over the past fifty 
years alone, Nakhonay has been occupied – but never subdued – by 
British, Canadian, American, Indian, Pakistani, and Soviet troops.  
  Nakhonay is located near the Maiwand, home of the Taliban’s 
Mullah Omar, and is rife with Taliban sympathizers and militants. 
Considered the spiritual home of the Taliban, it is symbolically important 
to the insurgency. With strong connections to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and 
other Gulf states, Nakhonay is known for housing some of the most 
radical Muslims in Afghanistan. In the mid-1990s, Saudi militants 
introduced Kandahar to a strict form of Salafi Islam. While Riyadh has 
downplayed the Kingdom’s ties to the fundamentalist movement (even 
going so far as to offer “rehabilitation” programs for captured Islamist 
fighters), Salafism remains a potent force in the Islamic world. As Michael 
Scheuer argues:  
 
Perhaps the best way to get a handle on this issue is to understand 
that much of the above—the attacks, the recanters, the re-
education camps, Riyadh’s ecumenical outreach—is a diversion 
from the key variable in the future vitality of Islamist militancy: 
The doctrine of Salafism and its continuing proliferation. Bin 
Laden and his allies are overwhelmingly Salafist; men and 
women who profess an austere, semi-martial brand of Sunni 
                                                          
12 Keith Gerein, “Soldier slain in Afghan blast 2 weeks from vacation,” Edmonton 
Journal, March 29, 2011, p. A5. 
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Islam based on the Quran, the Sunnah and the traditions of the 
“pious ancestors,” the first four generations of Islamic leaders. 
Salafism is Saudi Arabia’s state religion; it is taught at all levels 
of its school system to Saudis and others who come from abroad 
to study or are the children of immigrant Muslim workers and it 
is the faith Riyadh exports to all areas of the world via a large, 
well-funded proselytizing program staffed by Salafi clerics 
educated in the kingdom. Salafism is the engine of contemporary 
jihad; its base is in Saudi Arabia; and no amount of jihadist 
recanting or damning by the “king’s clerics” will stunt Salafi 
jihadism as long as the doctrine is taught and continues to grow 
in popularity.13 
 
Militants focused on Nakhonay because of its central location, strong 
Islamic background, and independently sustainable agricultural economy. 
Shortly after they targeted it, the area became known as the hub of the 
Taliban’s shadow government in Kandahar. 
Strategically speaking, Nakhonay and its surrounding villages in 
Panjwai District represent major choke points in southern Afghanistan. 
Not only is the area the historic birthplace of the Taliban, but its resilience 
against NATO forces sends a strong message to Afghan citizens to keep 
up the fight. From Nakhonay, Taliban leaders have coordinated large-scale 
attacks against NATO forces and interests. They keep fighters in nearby 
communities and are careful to use layers of communication when 
contacting them – strategies that allow the “shadow” leadership to 
maintain plausible deniability after incidents of insurgent violence. As one 
journalist covering the region has observed, “Canadian soldiers cleared 
Nakhonay in 2007 and twice in 2008 but, without the troop strength to 
                                                          
13 Scheuer, Michael, “Saudi Salafism a Stronger Force in Islamist Militancy than 
Recanting Clerics,”  Terrorism Focus vol. 5 no. 26, July 16, 2008. 
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remain in the area, insurgents seeped back in as soon as they left. The 
village continued to serve as the seat of the Taliban's shadow government 
in Kandahar province.”14 For the past decade, NATO forces have been 
attempting to build a case against the local officials in Nakhonay. Without 
direct evidence of their participation in insurgent activities, however, 
NATO has been unable to transition a new cadre of leaders into positions 
of power. Taliban leaders continue to operate freely in Nakhonay.  
The implementation of COIN strategies in the area is further 
complicated by the military’s use of ASCOPE (Area, Structures, 
Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events) – a method of assessing 
the role of cultural factors in tactical operations. Under ASCOPE, 
Coalition officials may not easily interfere with local power structures. So 
long as village leaders are perceived as key members of the community 
and are not directly involved in anti-NATO activities – such as placing 
bombs, directly attacking troops, or harboring weapons – it is virtually 
impossible to remove them.  
It’s clear that NATO forces have been tasked with a difficult, 
seemingly contradictory, mission: they must work to build relationships 
with local communities while also distancing themselves from the first 
layers of leadership in those groups. Haji Malma and his band of Taliban 
associates actively put themselves between the Canadian troops and the 
population, creating a complex social and military environment for the 
Canadian forces to navigate. As difficult as situations like this may be, 
NATO forces must explore alternative courses of action when confronted 
with them; they must pursue strategies that will ultimately delegitimize the 
Taliban’s “shadow” leaders, influence local populations in positive ways, 
and bring stability to Afghan communities. 
To fulfill these objectives, command directed a Human Terrain Team 
to develop a comprehensive picture of the operational environment and to 
                                                          
14 Dene Moore, “Canadian platoon’s life in Afghan village is a lesson in patience,” The 
Record [Waterloo, Ont.], Sept. 13, 2010. 
NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS 
16 
 
present its findings to the Commander of Task Force Kandahar. This six-
man team, consisting of subject matter experts, military tacticians, and 
communications specialists, embedded with Canadian forces for a 21-day 
mission.  
Mission objectives were as follows: 
1. Define characteristics of key civilian areas, including districts, 
municipalities, and provinces in the targeted area of operation. 
Focus efforts on areas of high economic value, centers of 
government or political discourse, culturally important areas, and 
tribal/ethnic enclaves. 
2. Analyze the capability of local authorities to perform key functions 
and provide the populace with essential services. Develop metrics 
of essential capabilities required to save and sustain life, including 
the development of health clinics, the provision of food, water, and 
sanitation services, and the operation of public administration and 
public safety organizations.  
3. Understand how the community is organized according to local 
definitions of order and influence. Distinguish who is formally and 
informally influential in the community and what characteristics 
(wealth, education, family lineage, ethnicity, and tribe) influence 
perception. Determine if influential members of the community are 
affiliated with organizations that may be indigenous to the area.  
When the assignment was over, the team had compiled significant data on 
Nakhonay’s social groups, power brokers, and hierarchy of needs. The 
team outlined targets of opportunity for implementing COIN and 
development strategies, assessed progress in the AO, determined second- 
and third-order effects of the current strategy, and identified fault lines 
between the Canadians and the populace.  
The team gave General Menard and General Vance of Task Force 
Kandahar recommendations in three areas:  
1. How to frame the issue of corruption  
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2. How to respond to Taliban supporters 
3. How to address combat outpost compensation 
 
A. Recommendation One: Rethinking Corruption  
Human Terrain System advisors encouraged Task Force Kandahar 
(TFK) not to remove key business leaders from the community, despite 
allegations of corruption.. Rather, they recommended that Task Force 
Kandahar focus on reconsidering its perception of development and 
stabilization in context with the cultural nuances of the community; 
specifically, distinguishing between market integration and our Western 
perception of corruption. 
At the local level in Afghanistan, where grassroots development 
and foreign direct investment have taken place, certain individuals are the 
major beneficiaries of those activities. These individuals control the 
majority of local business in their respective areas and absorb 99% of 
foreign development contracts from NATO, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations. Most development 
professionals and military decision makers do not know how to deal with 
these individuals effectively because of the specific Afghan business ethic; 
by Western standards, these businessmen should be in jail. 
 If we pull back and take a long-horizon perspective, the situation 
is far better than it appears. What these men represent is the first rung on 
the development ladder. In a country that lacks a rule of law, a structured 
economic market place and any accountability, these men have found a 
way to mitigate enormous risk and productively employ the local labor 
force, acquire scarce resources and synthesize labor and management to 
effectively achieve results. The effect accomplishes staggering economic 
gains and sets a precedent that is deeply encouraging for the local people. 
Furthermore, the economic structures they help establish lead to 
something even more important than higher rates of employment. Trade 
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and the opportunity for economic advancement make people behave more 
fairly. When individuals – regardless of their social stature – see 
themselves as part of the economic system, they recognize a sense of 
ownership in the community and begin to develop a competitive ethos that 
will drive them to improve their circumstances.  
There is no doubt that Afghanistan, ranked 176 out of 178 on the 
Corruption Perception Index,15 is one of the most corrupt countries on the 
planet. In order to understand why corruption is so prevalent there, it is 
helpful to first differentiate between bribery, kickbacks, and wholesale 
embezzling. Wholesale embezzling, or otherwise absconding with public 
money at the expense of the population, is a moot argument; its effect on 
the population, with the exception of the primary embezzler, is entirely 
damaging. On the other hand, corruption and kickbacks of public 
procurement act as a necessary evil to mitigate risk, leverage against 
liabilities, and promote cooperation. Afghanistan lacks accountability in 
the central government and regulation in the financial system. In light of 
these shortcomings, corruption may serve an important economic 
function; instead of being a product of dishonesty and greed, it may 
simply be a method toward market integration, a rational means of making 
up for a lack of oversight. Consider the following:Economic systems are 
built on relationships. In the West, the majority of time spent in business is 
devoted to soliciting clients and to maintaining relationships with them 
once they have been secured. This form of trust building enables each 
party to develop confidence in, and loyalty toward, the other. The amount 
of money spent on these activities dwarfs the amount that is spent on 
bribes, payoffs, and other “corrupt” payments in Afghanistan. While the 
patterns of exchange that exist in Afghanistan are defined as “corruption,” 
it’s worth remembering that these exchanges represent a rudimentary 
economic system, that they’re a form of establishing trust and cooperation 
with strangers, and that they’re intended to lower transaction costs and 
                                                          
15 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results  
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generate greater prosperity for all involved. Ultimately, they ensure 
mutually beneficial exchanges in situations where the participants are not 
bound by kinship, status, or other social ties. 
Ultimately a cost benefit analysis was conducted; results 
indicated that the removal of key business leadership in the area would 
inflict a catastrophic impact on the economy, including the larger 
Panjwai province. The assessment highlighted the vulnerabilities that 
new management would face in completing construction, training, and 
development tasks. Retaliation from said key business leadership could 
be expected through sabotage, direct attacks on NATO forces, and 
increased cooperation with Taliban forces. The contagious effect on 
unemployment would also create disastrous second- and third-order 
effects such as increased partnerships between locals and the Taliban, 
locals returning to poppy cultivation, increased vulnerability toward 
religious radicalization, and dire humanitarian consequences. 
Furthermore, after a comprehensive ethnographic study was completed 
on the topic of corruption, virtually the entire village agreed that the 
Western term “bribery” was nothing more than tarrun, an Afghan 
word for contract or agreement. 
 
 
B. Recommendation Two: Responding to Taliban 
Presence  
Social science operators advised TFK not to use violence when 
engaging low-level Taliban supporters and empathizers in the community. 
 The Taliban have significant influence in Nakhonay. Members 
have direct ties to civic and business leaders, and there is virtually no 
distinction between supporters of the insurgency and the local population. 
The community’s identity is rooted in the inception, history, and evolution 
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of the Taliban ethos. For the people who inhabit Nakhonay and the 
surrounding villages, the Taliban is not an insurgency of foreigners; the 
Taliban is family. Three decades of conflict, abuse, and manipulation have 
solidified the need for Taliban leadership in Nakhonay. Changing 
influence, needs-based strategic decision making, an evolving ethos, and a 
willingness to adapt to enemy tactics, however, have redefined the 
Taliban’s identity and operational tempo. In an effort to maintain 
legitimacy, allocate finances, garner support, and recruit members, the 
Taliban has evolved into a more shrewd and cosmopolitan insurgency. 
Essentially, the organization’s associates in the region are learning the 
advantages of waging war on multiple fronts — economic, political, and 
religious — making Nakhonay an excellent case study for the new face of 
the Taliban.  
The Taliban exist in Nakhonay on multiple levels. From 
information gathered on the ground, it would seem that “virtually 
everyone is associated with the Taliban.” Taliban exist in every mosque, 
business, farm, and home. Taliban leaders commute in and out of 
Nakhonay daily, their identity protected by a strong warrior ethos and 
“Takfiri”16 methodology. They’re mullahs, elders, shop owners, farmers, 
teachers, and doctors, and are represented in both the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Interestingly, the 
Taliban presence in Nakhonay has evolved over time, and the insurgency 
now exists in various layers within the community – all of them 
significant. Observing these layers, it is possible to distinguish between 
Taliban warriors, representatives, and supporters. The warrior class – 
including fighters, suicide bombers, and IED strategists – represents the 
frontline of the Taliban. The second layer, comprised of men known as 
                                                          
16 Takfiris have been classified by some commentators as violent offshoots of the Salafi 
movement, yet while Salafism is seen as a form of “fundamentalist Islam,” it is not an 
inherently violent movement and does not condone terrorism. Takfiris, on the other hand, 
condone acts of violence as legitimate methods of achieving religious or political goals. 
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“representatives,” seeks to influence community behavior by engaging in 
consensus-building activities and by lobbying decision makers in key 
industries. A third layer – the insurgency’s supporters – is not involved in 
direct action, but instead affects the community through propaganda and 
recruiting. The Taliban’s presence in Nakhonay consists predominately of 
the latter two groups, representatives and supporters.  
Ultimately, HTS encouraged Task Force Kandahar to allow 
Nakhonay to continue growing unabated, despite the area’s strong Taliban 
connections. At the time this recommendation was made, Task Force 
Kandahar was preparing for another clearing operation in the area. Since 
the many previous clearing operations had resulted in little to no change, it 
was the opinion of HTS field staff that a better strategy was needed. 
Analysts believed it might be more effective to divide and conquer the 
population through an oil spot plan, a strategy described in detail by Karl 
Slaikeu: 
 
The oil spot (OS) COIN strategy draws on the analogy of a 
cheese cloth representing a country. Drops of oil, one at a time 
and over time, eventually cover the entire cloth. The process 
begins with establishing a 100% secure perimeter, accomplished 
by CF in the first instance, and then transferred to local military 
in a particular village or other area of operation, and then, within 
this safe environment, launching stability initiatives, including 
services, governance, and development. With one OS functioning 
and under the protection of local army and police, CF partners 
with the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) to launch other OS 
villages. The advantages of this approach lie in the discrete gains 
that can be protected (as in shape, clear, hold, and build [FM 
3.24]), and most important, each oil spot is a visible 
manifestation of the desired end state for the entire war. Any 
friend, foe, or fence sitter can see what CF is up to by looking at 
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security protected and services rendered within the oil spot 
village/town/city.17 
 
Implementation of an OS strategy required both short- and long-
term planning. In the short term, TFK would develop a community on the 
periphery of Nakhonay (Haji Baba); there, troops would undertake 
reconstruction activities, broaden employment opportunities, and provide 
security. The long-term strategy involved further development of Haji 
Baba, ultimately giving the inhabitants of Nakhonay a perspective of what 
life could be if they cooperated with the Canadian forces. As a 2010 article 
suggests, the strategy appears to be working: “Canadian troops have since 
pulled out of Nakhonay. Reintjes' team has set up in a compound in the 
neighboring village of Haji Baba, where warm food and running water are 
a luxury. Reintjes recently set a personal record: 34 days without a 
shower…. A lot of things have changed since then, and they were in the 
thick of the action by August around Nakhonay, a town now infamous as a 
killing zone….”18  
 
 
C. Recommendation Three: Addressing Combat Outpost 
Compensation  
As discussed in the beginning of this case study, a Canadian 
regiment established a combat outpost in an abandoned home in the center 
of Nakhonay. After they moved in, they noticed a sharp uptick in the acts 
of violence directed against them. This violence did not match Human 
                                                          
17 Karl A. Slaikeu, “Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot Plus Strategy for 
Coalition Forces,” Small Wars Journal May 2009. 
18 Jonathan Montpetit, “Canadian soldiers resume mentoring Afghan National Army after 
turbulent spring,” Military World, Oct. 28, 2010. Even locals seem to have been 
anticipating a relatively calm few months due to the increased Canadian troop presence. 
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Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting, which indicated that Taliban fighters 
had left the area to harvest poppies in Helmand. General Menard of TFK 
instructed HTS members to go into the field to determine the source of the 
hostility and what could be done to fix it.  
A team of six HTS members visited the area and interviewed 
locals. The team learned that a sub-tribe was angry at the regiment for 
having moved into one of the local homes. This home was owned by a 
village elder, a man from their tribe who lived in Kandahar half of the year 
and in his Nakhonay home the other half of the year. The Canadian 
regiment hadn’t realized this when they selected the home as their outpost 
station. The violence, then, was the sub-tribe’s method of retaliation; they 
were attacking the Canadian troops in an effort to drive them from the 
elder’s property. After the HTT discovered this, they organized a meeting 
between the Platoon and the elder, ultimately devising a compensation 
repayment plan covering the regiment’s occupation of the compound. 
Within days, violence in the area noticeably decreased and relations 
between the community and the Canadians improved.  
 
 
Discussion Questions  
1. Can the population be positively influenced despite corrupt 
leadership? Do you always have to remove corrupt leaders, or can 
you work around them? How do you do this? What are the risks to 
your objectives and to the people you are working with? 
2. If you knew that the only way to build a school, health 
clinic, or road in Afghanistan involved bribery, would you pay the 
bribe in order to pursue the development project? Where would 
you draw the line? 
3. When we talk about “helping the Afghans,” does that imply 
that we indoctrinate them with U.S. values? Can we help them 
while also observing their ethical standards? What are the 
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risks/rewards of each approach? When do the risks outweigh the 
rewards? What does “helping Afghans” really mean? 
4. In an area that is thick with Taliban sympathizers and 
insurgents, can COIN-by-proxy (as in the case of Haji Baba) create 
a demand for change among the local population?  
5. Given Nakhonay’s profile, what other options were 
available? 
6. What was missed?  
7. What vulnerabilities can be exploited in Nakhonay to turn 
people against the Taliban?  
8. What is the role of land tenure? 
9. What negative effects are associated with giving in to local 
pressure? 
10. Despite the success of the mission, what were the risks and 
limitations of the effort? 
11. What could have prevented the escalation in violence in the 
first place? 
12. What would have been the likely outcome in each scenario 
without the HTS recommendations? What alternative courses of 
action would have been taken, and what would their effects be?  
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 Tagab Valley has never been held by a foreign force. Known as 
“The Lost Valley” by the Soviets, Tagab has long been a major Pashtun 
enclave, housing some of the greatest fighters in Afghanistan. For 
centuries, Tagab has celebrated a strong warrior culture by housing, 
feeding, and providing medical care for fighters in the area. The legacy 
that defines Tagab is based on the work of the late Mashayakh Miagul Jan 
Aga (aka Mohammad Sharif). Mohammad Sharif was a prominent leader 
who was instrumental in organizing regional opposition to the communist 
government in northern Afghanistan. Mujahedeen fighters used Tagab as a 
regional combat outpost for direct attacks against Soviet interests in Kabul 
Figure 2: Tagab Valley 
Map 1.1 Tagab Valley 
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and Bagram Air Base. That esprit de corps is still present in the region 
today, and is bolstered by external actors who have helped create a strong 
indigenous fighting force in the community. As noted in a recent Center 
for Naval Analysis report, “The southern Tagab Valley was a stronghold 
of Pakistan-based insurgents responsible for numerous large-scale attacks 
in eastern Afghanistan. Enemy fighters moved freely through the area and 
controlled the population. There was no government presence there in 
2008.”19  
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 
2001, NATO allies have been unable to clear and secure Tagab. Fierce 
Taliban fighters, as well as politically motivated insurgencies such as 
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) and the Haqqani network, compete for 
territorial control of the area.20 “Many of the insurgents making this push, 
according to this NGO worker, are actually from Pakistan: the HiG 
networks in the province remain mostly as they were, at least 
geographically (so mostly limited to places like the Tagab). While last 
night the police finally arrested one of the insurgent surveillance teams, 
there is tremendous concern that, much like in early 2008, Haqqani 
Network and HiG fighters will use Kapisa as a staging ground to launch 
anti-election attacks on Kabul.”21 
 Logistical, historical, and geographic features make Tagab 
especially attractive to these groups. Located at the base of the Hindu 
Kush Mountains, Tagab Valley is a weapons and narcotics hub. Insurgents 
have established complex routes through the seemingly impassable chain 
of mountains that directly link Tagab to Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate 
of Waziristan. “The [Tagab] valley, only 30 miles from Kabul, is rife with 
drug and timber smugglers, as well as insurgents. The insurgents are 
                                                          
19Jerry-Katt Meyerle and Jim Megan-Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency on the Ground in 
Afghanistan,” CNA Analysis & Solutions, November 2010. 
20 Jeffrey H. Norwitz,“Armed Groups,” US Naval War College, August 2008. 
21Joshua Foust, “Kapisa Teeters,” Registan.net, 2009. 
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Taliban fighters and gunmen loyal to warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 
Officials say that based on their accents, some of the men appear to be 
Pakistani and Uzbeki.”22 Tagab’s proximity to Kabul and Bagram Air 
Force Base has also made it a significant strategic location for the Taliban. 
Over the past decade, countless attacks on Kabul and Bagram have been 
planned and executed from this Taliban staging ground.  
On April 28, 2008, during a high-profile parade honoring 
Afghanistan National Day in downtown Kabul, Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai and dozens of top-ranking NATO military and civilian leadership 
experienced the brazen contempt of the Taliban. At the height of the 
ceremony, gunfire erupted in close proximity to Karzai and several NATO 
dignitaries, sending the crowd into a panic. Chaos ensued as Afghan and 
NATO troops worked frantically to secure an area in which there was no 
clear shooter and thousands were running for their lives. The Taliban 
experienced a major victory that day. It sent a global message that, despite 
the best efforts of the world’s most powerful countries, it was still in 
control of Afghanistan. NATO leadership, stunned at the clandestine 
nature of the attack, tracked the center of the operation to Tagab, a small 
village in Kapsia Province. According to a reporter covering the story, 
“The Taliban's ability to attack a ceremony amid heightened security in 
the heart of Kabul while scores of VIPs attended served as a major 
propaganda coup for the Taliban who previously claimed they can launch 
an attack anywhere in Afghanistan at a time of their choosing. The 
preceding raid in Kapisa may also be significant, indicating the Taliban's 
reliance on the Tagab Valley as the key staging ground for attacks against 
targets in Kabul and Bagram.”23  
                                                          
22 Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson,“US-Afghan Forces Try to Stabilize Lawless Region,” NPR, 
2007. 
23 Matt Dupee, “Kapisa Province: The Taliban’s Gateway to Kabul,” The Long War 
Journal, April 2008. 
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As of October 2010, ISAF forces switched from an offensive to 
defensive operational posture in Tagab. The area of operation, governed 
by the French with an embedded US Army SOF ODA and a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team, has yet to clear the AO (excluding the Tagab 
bazaar). Simply stated, the area is too dangerous to conduct an offensive 
“build” strategy. As one French commander observed, French troops take 
fire four out of five times outside the wire and are unable to drive the 
Taliban back from their positions. In a conversation with a French soldier, 
an American-born Legionnaire echoed the commander’s sentiment: 
 
When we go on patrol we get contact from all sides. Other than 
FOB Kutschbach, we have no safe areas. For example, we see 
farmers working in the fields. We stop and talk with them. 
Sometimes they offer us a drink, raisins or nuts. We part with a 
smile and a hand shake. A kilometer down the road we take 
contact. Ten minutes later we are taking fire from all around in a 
complex attack. When the dust settles it was the farmers that we 
talked to who coordinated the attack. A different culture and 
language drives our inability to connect to the people. Half the 
time we just hang around the Afghans without even talking to 
them and check the COIN box. 
 
US forces in the area have not fared better. The US Army SOF at 
Kutschbach in particular has their hands full. They’re tasked with the 
important role of training the Afghan military and police, as well as the 
local route maintenance teams (RMT) that provide security along major 
roadways. Recently, however, SOF at Kutschbach have been ordered to 
undertake more High Value Target (HVT) missions. This change in 
strategy has limited the unit’s ability to achieve its grassroots objectives. 
The HVT missions have had a double edged effect in the community. The 
assassination of Taliban leaders – tenured officials in many Afghan 
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communities – often creates a power vacuum, reviving long-standing 
feuds and rivalries among political factions. These factions then jockey for 
position, as each is hoping to win territorial control of the country when 
NATO pulls out. Without accountable, pro-NATO replacements prepped 
to replace Taliban leadership, the effort is circuitous.  
US Army SOF are also restricted to the immediate area around the 
FOB and are not able to realize their full potential in the battle space. 
Valleys and main supply routes in Tagab are deemed “too risky” by ISAF 
command. These limitations have been construed as stifling to both Army 
SOF operators and members of the Provincal Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT), both of whom are eager to effect change in Afghanistan. Part of the 
tension is due to friction between French and US command, the two 
Coalition entities competing for control of the battlespace. Unable to 
communicate with each other effectively, they’ve set aside many pressing 
issues in the AO so as not to worsen their already tenuous relationship. 
Furthermore, PRTs, USAID, and other aid organizations implement 
programs, train locals, and give generously to construction projects for 
schools, roads, and wells. However, schools are empty, roads unused, and 
wells dry. This has been the situation for almost five years, and little or no 
change has occurred in the region. Although this case does not represent 
all regions in Afghanistan, it does exemplify a decade’s worth of operation 
protocol in which strategy has been sacrificed for tactical ambition. 
French-led operations in Tagab have evolved haphazardly; instead of 
implementing proactive, consciously formulated strategies, French 
commanders have developed a largely reactive posture. Understanding 
this phenomenon, military and civilian leadership have begun to take 
greater care in consulting operators in the field. Their hope is that doing so 
will prevent further errors and help construct strategies with longer-term 
success.  
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An HTT member embedded with US Army Special Forces 
Operation Detachment Alfa for a 60-day mission. Based on the problems 
presented, the following mission objectives were developed: 
1. Define characteristics of key civilian areas, including districts, 
municipalities, and provinces in the targeted area of operation. 
Focus efforts on areas of high economic value, centers of 
government or political discourse, culturally important areas, 
and tribal/ethnic enclaves. 
2. Analyze the capability of local authorities to perform key 
functions and provide the populace with essential services. 
Develop metrics of essential capabilities required to save and 
sustain life, including the development of health clinics, the 
provision of food, water, and sanitation services, and the 
operation of public administration and public safety 
organizations.  
3. Understand how the community is organized according to local 
definitions of order and influence. Distinguish who is formally 
and informally influential in the community and what 
characteristics (wealth, education, family lineage, ethnicity, 
and tribe) influence perception. Determine if influential 
members of the community are affiliated with organizations 
that may be indigenous to the area.  
 
A specific directive was given by French General Chavany to answer the 
following questions:  
1. How are insurgents undermining NATO efforts in the 
region? Are they using our capabilities against us 
(development funding, SOF training, technological 
prowess)? How does the population respond to NATO 
forces working in the area? Has there been a trend of 
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success or failure with gaining the support of the 
population? 
2. How can NATO control the direction and outcome of the 
conflict? What are our weaknesses and strengths, and how 
can we improve upon them?  
3. Who are the informal leaders in the community? Other than 
appointed district governors and village elders, who does 
the population trust? Where does the population go in order 
to resolve conflicts or receive advice?  
 
When the assignment was over, the HTT member reported his findings. 
He identified development funding as a trigger point for conflict in 
Kapisa, drew attention to the unintended economic consequences of 
providing direct aid to locals in Tagab, and underscored the value of 
identifying and working with second and third layers of leadership. 
Ultimately, the information, resources, and effort that went into the 
mission were subject to the discretion of NATO leadership. The following 
assessments were made to General Chavancy, PRT Kapisa, the civilian 
and military leadership in Kabul, and the political and military leadership 
in France. 
 
A. Recommendation One: Address Road Compensation  
PRT and French commanders implemented a road construction 
plan in Kapisa. The concept behind the program was to pave roads and 
open routes to otherwise inaccessible villages. The long-term goal was to 
increase traffic frequency to remote areas, bringing about economic and 
security gains for each village. PRT Kapisa contracted the work to an 
Afghan construction and security company. A noticeable increase in 
violence occurred within the area shortly after the road construction plan 
went into effect. PRT Kapisa and French forces utilized Human Terrain 
Systems to engage the population and determine the cause of the violence.  
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According to the HTT assessment, the second- and third-order 
effects of the road compensation plan had fueled hostility, violence, and 
corruption. The Afghan construction team used its private security force to 
intimidate and forcibly remove individuals from homes and farmland. 
Afghan private security teams demanded payment from homeowners to 
build around their properties; those who could not afford the collateral lost 
everything they had. Building through homes and private farms yielded a 
higher profit margin for the construction company, cutting costs that 
would have otherwise gone into building around local properties. This 
increased violence in Kapisa province and created a 
security/accountability vacuum in which the population felt it had no 
recourse to justice.  
Moreover, the contractors paid off local Afghan police and military 
forces so that they would not interfere with the company’s program of 
extortion. Taliban forces took advantage of this situation by providing the 
community with immediate justice and security. They further capitalized 
on the situation by creating a divide between the populace and NATO 
forces.  
After social scientists completed their field work and assessments, 
they reported their findings to command leaders and field operators. This 
led to a change in strategy and immediate results. For example, “[w]hen 
the local population expressed dissatisfaction with previous attempts at 
road compensation for homes and shops that were destroyed so the road 
could be widened, Kapisa PRT and the Human Terrain Team re-initiated 
road compensation discussions during a meeting with 20 local farmers in 
April at Forward Operating Base Morales-Frazier.”24 Subsequent 
measures included a successful road compensation program and the firing 
of the contracted construction and security companies.  
                                                          
24 “Kapisa PRT, Contractors Pay Road Compensation,” n.d., 
http://www.dvidshub.net/news/58062/kapisa-prt-contractors-pay-road-compensation 
(accessed August 2012). 




B. Recommendation Two: Identify Layers of Leadership  
Tagab Valley, a Taliban incubation point with strong foreign 
connections, has been under comprehensive Taliban rule since the early 
1990s. Taliban infestation saturates the community to the point where 
NATO forces have called the AO a “no go zone.” “When the Marines 
arrived in April 2008, the Tagab Valley was considered a no go area 
where insurgents moved freely.”25 Leadership in the community was 
restricted to two or three individuals in town. Locals appealed to NATO 
forces, pleading that their needs were not being met. After nearly six 
weeks, US Army SOF and a Human Terrain Team social science field 
researcher devised an alternative plan to address the needs of the populace. 
This entailed marginalizing the first layer of leadership and identifying 
new sources of power and authority. A key finding was that mullahs held 
considerable influence in the community. Using religion as a unifying 
force, they were able to transcend tribal, ethnic, and familial bonds. 
Furthermore, they had the unique ability to challenge the Taliban while 
still holding the respect of the population.  
To gain influence among the population and establish new 
leadership in the community, HTS personnel began holding an “alternative 
shura.” The intent was to appeal to the vanity of patriarchal figures in the 
community. Implementation of the strategy was fairly simple: at the first 
community-wide shura, local elites were asked, in front of the larger 
community, to join ISAF leaders for a special leadership shura. While the 
first layer participated in this exclusive shura, second and third layers of 
leadership were identified; using a method of systematic questioning, HTT 
analysts drew out natural leaders in the community, those who locals 
respond to when the community’s institutionalized leaders are not present. 
                                                          
25 Jerry-Katt Meyerle and Jim Megan-Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency on the Ground in 
Afghanistan,” CNA Analysis & Solutions, November 2010. 
NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS 
34 
 
Not only did the team identity these unofficial leaders but they also 
learned important information about the community as a whole. The 
general consensus of the people in Tagab was that their leaders were a 
disappointment. In the end, the alternative shura concept helped identify 
new layers of leadership and addressed the communication gap between 
Tagab’s population and its leaders. 
After nearly two months, social scientists developed a strategy for 
engaging with Tagab’s highly kinetic populace. This strategy was based 
on the development of a working relationship between the Coalition and 
local mullahs. Unlike the area’s businessmen, elders, and other leaders, 
Tagab’s mullahs were not susceptible to Taliban influence. They not only 
had the respect and trust of the community but were connected to 
syndicate insurgencies in the AO,– ties that further distanced them from 
the Taliban. When roaming Taliban teams came through Tagab and tried 
to intimidate the mullahs, locals routinely stood up and drove the Taliban 
out. Ultimately, the people unanimously pointed to their mullahs as the 
most trustworthy individuals in the village. In Tagab, Mullahs hold a 
special place in the community because they are able to overcome tribal, 
ethnic, familial, and economic feuds. This is extremely important in a 
society influenced by multiple ideologies and ethnicities. The mullah, 
through Islam, represents a point of cohesion, a unifying force in a land 
defined by foreign occupation, war, and death.  
 
 
C. Recommendation Three: Prevent Dollarization and 
Crowding Out the Population  
Within Tagab is a bazaar that hosts over 10,000 people a week. 
This bazaar is one of the main commercial hubs in Kapisa Province, and is 
also the economic lifeblood for the people of Tagab. Food, medical 
supplies, farm equipment, and basic household products are imported to 
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the bazaar from Iran and Pakistan, as well as from other provinces within 
Afghanistan. These products are essential for the survival of the people of 
Tagab. Over the past few years, prices in the bazaar have undergone 
unprecedented levels of inflation. This has had a dramatic effect on the 
population; goods and services that were previously accessible are now 
fiscally out of reach. The community has suffered greatly and correctly 
blames NATO for their predicament.  
During a comprehensive review of the economic situation in 
Tagab, subject matter experts discovered that NATO forces were 
purchasing significant quantities of food and medical supplies from the 
bazaar. This practice, extremely common throughout Afghanistan, 
essentially crowded out the local population, depriving them of access to 
the market and its goods and services. According to the subject matter 
experts who investigated this economic conundrum, several factors were 
at play. First, NATO forces had unintentionally bid up the value of the 
local merchandise. Markets in Afghanistan do not have the same level of 
accessibility that markets in the West enjoy. Restrictions in transportation, 
barriers to entry, and a lack in vendor supply limit the quantity of most 
goods throughout Afghanistan. When NATO forces in Tagab began 
attending the bazaar, they bought nearly all of the limited goods that were 
available. Local merchants, cognizant of NATO’s purchasing power, 
increased their prices, a measure which only served to exclude the local 
community further. NATO troops, believing their behavior to be generous, 
continued to satiate the price demands of the merchants.  
Another problem stemmed from NATO’s use of non-Afghan 
currency when purchasing goods. This issue, loosely dubbed 
“dollarization,” effectively drove down the value of Afghan currency in 
the community, thus increasing the cost of goods and services to area 
residents. According to the local population, the infusion of large amounts 
of cash in the bazaar economy never trickled down. Rather, it helped pay 
for lavish homes in Dubai, where a cartel of owners – men who controlled 
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shops in bazaars throughout the region – lived. “Jabarkhel [Brigadier 
General Mohammed Asif Jabarkhel] is referring to the huge amounts of 
money regularly being secreted out of Afghanistan by plane in boxes and 
suitcases. According to some estimates, since 2007, at least $3 billion 
(€2.4 billion) in cash has left the country in this way. The preferred 
destination for these funds is Dubai, the tax haven in the Persian Gulf. 
And, given the fact that Afghanistan's total GDP amounts to the equivalent 
of $13.5 billion, there is no way that the funds involved in this exodus are 
merely the proceeds of legal business transactions.”26 Back in 
Afghanistan, the bazaar cartel paid insurgents to protect their financial 
interests.  
These factors have contributed to growing resentment and anger 
toward NATO in Tagreb. As locals themselves have noted, the economic 
disruption has contributed to increased violence against NATO forces in 
the community. Social science operators and subject matter experts 
provided this information to French military and civilian leaders in 
Afghanistan and France. These leaders determined that Coalition forces 
should NOT enter the Afghan commercial market, a strategy which would 
prevent them from inadvertently determining how much the average 
Afghan pays for goods. Instead, NATO payments were to reflect the 
average consumer price index.  
The problem of Coalition troops distorting local economies is 
persistent throughout Afghanistan. In Kabul, for instance, prices of homes 
have increased to the point where locals are no longer able to afford living 
in the capital. NATO forces, NGOs, and multinational corporations have 
effectively driven the prices of homes up and the indigenous population 
out. “According to local estate agents prices in some parts of Kabul have 
risen by 75% in the past year. Part of this is due to the fact that 
international agencies are willing to pay to acquire properties in the best 
                                                          
26Susanna Koelbl, “US Cuts Aid After Millions Siphoned Off to Dubai,” Spiegel Online 
International, July 5, 2010.  
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locations, but also wealthy Afghans are buying again, having had their 
fingers burned in badly hit real estate markets such as Dubai.”27 
 
Discussion Questions  
1. What role does the military have in coordinating with USAID and 
following up with the allocation of Commander Emergency 
Response Funding (CERP)? 
2. What was wrong with the assumption that having an “Afghan” 
face on the road construction project would have positive effects? 
3. How can a situation like this be prevented in the future? 
4. Why was it necessary to bring in an HTT to determine the source 
of the road construction conflict? Why did it take team input to 
initiate a compensation plan for the disenfranchised locals?  
5. How were local Taliban taking advantage of friction, and of seams 
and gaps in communications? Why were they able to do this? 
6. What could have backfired in the alternative shura? What were the 
risks and were they worth the rewards? 
7. What happens when the Taliban identify this strategy and how 
might they adapt? What do you do next? 
8. What are other methods to communicate effectively with the 
population without being filtered by the Taliban and corrupt 
leadership?  
9. What does it take to develop a working relationship with power 
brokers in the community? Can you do it without providing money 
and doing favors? 
10. If the mullahs worked with NATO and were protected by the 
population, how would the Taliban respond?  
11. How can NATO forces support the Afghan economy without 
crowding out the local population? 
                                                          
27 James Melik, “Property Market in Afghanistan Capital Bucks Trend,” BBC World 
Service, 2009. 
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12. If NATO forces do decide to purchase goods from a local 
merchant, what steps can be made to ensure price stability for the 
Afghan consumer? 
13. Other than buying goods from locals, what can NATO forces do, 
even at a combat outpost, to encourage development and protect 
the interests of the Afghan livelihood? 
14. What are the primary economic weaknesses that are exploited by 
the Taliban? 
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IV. Relevance of Social Science Research in Combat 
Zones  
 
 Bringing a social science capacity to the battle-space offers leaders 
a unique perspective, adding substantive value to the military decision-
making process. Individuals trained in the social sciences (economics, 
sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology) understand the 
many social factors germane to conflict and are well-positioned to present 
qualified viewpoints on relevant issues. Broadly speaking, they provide a 
baseline on how to understand and interpret social dynamics. But they can 
also address more specific information needs. For instance, if a need exists 
for an in-depth analysis unique to a particular social science discipline, 
commanders can request a consultation to suit that need. Ultimately, the 
value social science provides is in three areas: challenging group think, 
mapping second- and third-order effects, and providing technical analyses.  
People who are collectively taught, isolated from outside 
influences, and exposed to a single point of view are potentially limited in 
their ability to think outside the parameters of their training. This is true 
regardless of the organization responsible for instruction, and it results in 
individuals who are prone to lapses in self-awareness. Defined as 
“groupthink,” this phenomenon can make people reluctant to offer diverse 
opinions, as doing so may upset the larger organizational balance. Instead 
of considering alternative scenarios and opposing arguments, individuals 
are encouraged to make hasty, often irrational, decisions. In the aggregate, 
these “programmed” behaviors can have a debilitating effect on an 
organization. This situation is exacerbated in hierarchical organizations 
like the military, where individuals are tempted to misrepresent 
themselves to superiors in order to further their careers. To battle this type 
of cognitive failure, it is necessary to encourage exogenous factors of 
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influence. As noted in a 2008 US News and World Report article, the 
Army itself has become wary of the role groupthink plays in military 
affairs: “In the wake of chaos and a lethal insurgency in Iraq, blamed in no 
small part on poor decisions and a lack of planning at the highest levels, 
the U.S. Army has had a startling insight that is upending conventional 
thinking about how the military works. That epiphany is that the force 
needs fewer yes men.”28  
Social scientists can play a fundamental role in creating a more 
adaptive force precisely because they bring a civilian mindset to the 
military context. They can ameliorate a soldier’s temptation to stereotype, 
self-censor, and display unquestioned discipline. By playing “devil’s 
advocate,” they encourage deeper levels of analysis and reflection. 
Ultimately, their involvement in military operations is designed to 
improve the quality and consistency of military decision-making process. 
In a counterinsurgency environment, it is paramount to the success 
of the mission that military officials and frontline soldiers fully understand 
how they are perceived by the local public. It is equally important to 
realize how the strategies of outside actors affect the populace. The 
application of systems such as HTS fulfills both missions. Commanders 
can utilize social science research by tasking SMEs with specific 
investigations related to planned courses of action. Studying social 
reactions in this way enables Coalition forces to anticipate or prevent the 
development of community grievances and, ultimately, violence. If we are 
to minimize failures on the battlefield, if we are to learn from previous 
errors and realize success in Afghanistan, mapping second- and third-order 
effects must be a standard requirement in military decision-making 
processes. 
The greatest benefit derived from mapping second- and third-order 
effects has to do with prevention. Using forecasting techniques, social 
                                                          
28 Anna Mulrine, “The army trains a skeptics corps to battle groupthink, ” US News and 
World Report, May 2008. 
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science operators can evaluate and project how the population will react to 
military action, albeit overt or covert.. Knowing the likely effect is 
fundamental to building confidence and establishing consistency with the 
populace. In virtually every field – including business, sports, government, 
academia, science, and entertainment – professionals seek to develop a 
matrix for understanding the second- and third-order effects of their work. 
It stands to reason, considering the complex nature of war, that military 
leaders embrace a similarly analytical approach.  
 
 
A. Consumers of Social Science Research in the Battle 
Space 
Military and civilian personnel, regardless of rank or position, 
benefit from the higher degrees of understanding, awareness, and 
interpretation that social science frameworks offer. Social science research 
can be tailored to the operational relevance of the consumer, whether a 
general, a commander, or an intelligence organization; in fact, it is best 
utilized when guided or administered by the consumer. Sending social 
scientists into the field, where they can pick up the rhythm and feel of 
battle, allows for a unique perspective in the decision-making process.  
General officers have the most to gain from these efforts. Acting as 
consultants, social scientists are tasked directly by the general officer and 
therefore operate outside the purview of his support staff. This 
arrangement is by design. Securing a direct line of communication from 
SMEs to command leaders ensures that information is delivered unfiltered, 
with no additional commentary or bias. Considering the evaluative nature 
of this information, direct communications are essential. Social scientists 
assess the effectiveness of strategies that have already been implemented, 
including their impact on the populace and on other critical information 
components. They evaluate campaigns, leadership, operational efficiency, 
and public sentiment – all in an effort to contribute to the overall 
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effectiveness of the general’s operational strength. This work is also 
important in that it fills a gap in command’s understanding of the battle-
space. In traditional military operations and chains of command, generals 
only get information about the enemy. Indeed, it is striking how little 
knowledge generals and commanders above the brigade level have of the 
population in their charge. This is especially worrisome in places like 
Afghanistan, where the populace is extremely segmented and diverse.  
Commanders at the battalion, company, and platoon levels benefit 
from the work of social scientists both strategically and operationally. 
Embedded SMEs provide cultural information to help soldiers better 
understand and work with the target population. They help soldiers 
develop a greater awareness of cultural nuances and share specific 
strategies and techniques for engaging locals. Social scientists participate 
in level zero planning processes; this includes working with military 
personnel to develop targets of opportunity with the community, to 
contextualize the various layers of influence present in target areas, and to 
anticipate points of contention. It also entails training locals to isolate 
insurgents. Social scientists work on cultural and economic assessments to 
determine the pace of development and the origins of influence – cultural, 
financial, and religious – in each community. Furthermore, social 
scientists give soldiers on patrol a sense of purpose and direction. Instead 
of walking through a community, social scientists encourage patrols to 
stop, talk with individual Afghans, and develop relationships with them. 
Social scientists develop frameworks for understanding the businesses, 
mosques, agricultural fields, and ethnic enclaves in which Coalition 
soldiers must operate – frameworks that they then provide to command for 
consideration.  
Finally, social scientists provide intelligence organizations a 
clearer picture of the non-combatant side of the population. While 
traditional intelligence is mainly focused on the kinetic population, social 
science research focuses entirely on the non-kinetic side of the population. 
NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS 
43 
 
As alluded to in a 2010 report on intelligence operations in Afghanistan,29 
a narrow kinetic focus puts the entire mission in jeopardy:  
 
 Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence 
community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. 
Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection 
efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast 
intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions 
about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate 
and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics 
and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how 
they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations 
between various development projects and the levels of 
cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the 
best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan 
soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but 
shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the 











30 Flynn, GEN. Michael T./Pottinger, CAPT Matt/Batchelor, Paul, “Fixing Intel: A 
Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American 
Security. Jan 2010. 







Discussion Questions  
1. What are the limitations to social science research in a battlefield 
environment? 
2. What difficulty might there be in persuading a military officer or 
his superiors to accept unexpected second- and third-order effects 
that a SME foresees? 
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V. Methodology  
 
 The methodology outlined below is designed to draw out societal 
grievances that explain and predict anti-NATO activities . This data 
collection plan serves as a resource for commanders and field operators in 
Afghanistan, including leaders tasked with implementing COIN strategies, 
building consensus, and reducing casualties. The methodology is simple in 
theory, but it is dangerous to execute and its effects are challenging to 
analyze. To implement this type of advisory program successfully, 
individuals must act resolutely and examine data rigorously. They must 
also be flexible, as the methodology itself may be refined to meet 
operational needs.  
The method of analysis is ordered into a three-step data collection 
plan: the identification of group identity, the study of community power 
structures, and the analysis of local hierarchies of need.  
 
A. Step One: Social Identity  
In the counterinsurgency battle-space, identifying social groups 
must be the first priority. Ancillary factors such as economics, religion, 
and culture must be contextualized within the sphere of the social group. 
This is especially important in less developed states that lack 
accountability in the central government. Foundational elements like 
religion can vastly differ from one social group to another, despite 
logistical proximity and historical ties. This phenomenon has become 
prevalent in Afghanistan, due to years of destabilization from war, 
poverty, and lawlessness. Social groups have developed as religious and 
tribal microcosms. Afghans can no longer be identified through their tribe 
or region. The Afghan identity is understood at the village level and is 
subject to innumerable factors relative to each region. The following 
outlines a systematic process for developing an awareness of the social 
groups that exert spheres of influence in Afghan communities.  
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To begin, it is important to develop an outline of how people 
identify themselves in a community. What beliefs do they subscribe to? 
Where do they live? How are they organized? Where do they congregate? 
The purpose of asking these questions is to collect metrics, which are then 
used to identify similarities in how people identify themselves relative to 
one another. The collector must make these determinations himself, rather 
than depend on the community’s definition.  
Considerations such as geographic location, territorial control, 
tribal/sub-tribal affiliation, mosque affiliation, areas of contention, and 
leadership provide a broad picture of how social groups define 
membership. The key factor is identifying how these groups interact with 
each other. Chances are that conflict exists within the community, and 
identifying those conflict triggers will play a large role in understanding 
how the insurgency manipulates the population. Ultimately, the 
community will divide into social groups for the purpose of survival and 
shared interest. Make no mistake: on the surface, ideology will appear to 
be the primary adhesive component to the group. In reality, however, 
pragmatic factors such as security and mutual economic interest are more 
fundamental to group dynamics.  
 
B. Step Two: Civic Power Study 
After a thorough collection and analysis of the social structure, 
focus should move toward developing an exhaustive understanding of who 
is formally and informally influential in the community. Understanding 
layers of leadership in the community is essential for developing allies and 
identifying enemies. On the surface, community leaders may deliberately 
misrepresent themselves in order to lull interviewers into dropping their 
guard and being more trusting.  
If leadership in the community is not tied to insurgency, it is still 
important to understand who is effective and who is not. To develop 
metrics on leadership, understanding which leadership traits are esteemed 
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in the community is essential. Traits such as wealth, prestige, number of 
wives, education, familial lineage, land ownership, and insurgent ties will 
afford varying degrees of power and influence. The weight of each trait is 
relative to each community. That being said, it is necessary to seek 
answers from the population to understand what it takes to become a 
leader, to review how leaders in the community gained power, and to 
understand how those positions have evolved historically. Finally, gaps 
and layers of leadership in the community should be identified. This is the 
most important component in plotting the power scheme that determines 
social hierarchy. Generally speaking, first-layer leadership in a community 
under the control or influence of an insurgency will have connections with 
said insurgency. The first layers will not always represent the will and 
voice of the community. To properly assess and affect the populace, 
identifying who is in informal leadership positions is absolutely essential. 
These individuals form the second layer of leadership and can accurately 
represent the true dynamics of the community. They can also fill 
leadership vacuums in the event that first layers are removed.  
 
C. Step Three: Hierarchy of Needs 
Finally, the social science operator will establish a hierarchy of 
needs in terms of economy, infrastructure, education, and health care. It is 
important to establish a rank of needs in the community to determine the 
urgency of implementing scarce resources. More importantly, it is 
paramount to the success of the development scheme to identify if the 
allocation will trigger conflict.  
It is important to consider the most unbiased perspective when 
assessing the community. Virtually everyone is going to have a personal 
stake in acquiring development/reconstruction funds and will do and say 
whatever it takes to benefit. To properly assess the needs of the populace, 
a thorough examination of the community must occur outside the 
observations of the community members. 
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The first priority must be to develop a baseline collection plan that 
will focus on cataloguing the quality, availability and restrictions of food 
staples. Who has access and why? It is important to consider the current 
price and what the pricing trends have been over the past few years. Other 
factors include where the food comes from, price discrimination, 
environmental factors (flood, drought), and abundance (does farming exist 
to the level to provide for the whole community?). The next priority 
should be to assess the quality of waste management, including the 
sanitary condition of the community. Social scientists need to collect 
water samples, examine refuse outlets, and determine where human waste 
is discarded. In less-developed communities, disease caused by unsanitary 
conditions can wipe out the populace despite ample food resources. 
Development professionals are often afraid to tackle this issue out of fear 
of offending the populace and a general disdain for the subject. The reality 
is, no matter how many schools, medical clinics, or roads are built, if the 
people cannot live in sanitary conditions, efforts are moot. Other areas of 
infrastructure include quality and availability of roads, medical care, 
schools and communications. Determining the availability and abundance 
of said infrastructure inputs will provide a clear picture of the 
community’s priorities.  
 
D. Implementation and Field Research 
Field research and collection techniques make up the meat of what 
the social science operator does in the field. Without time in the field, 
observing, analyzing, and interviewing, the product is nothing more than a 
regurgitation of previous work and effort. Thus it is important to 
understand what a social scientist does in the field, how he/she collects 
information, interacts with the populace, assesses events, analysis data, 
and essentially creates a niche that others, without similar training and 
experience, could not do. Social science field research or combat 
ethnography cannot occur without fluid integration with the unit. The unit 
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must feel comfortable with the individual both professionally, tactically, 
and personally. A humble, honest, and professional demeanor is absolutely 
necessary to make the relationship work. Ultimately, the social scientist 
works at the behest of the unit and subsequent commanders. Although he 
or she should have a voice in the planning process, hierarchical decrees 
ultimately dictate operational tempo and priorities.  
The intent of pursuing data is to provide a baseline assessment that 
will grow and develop according to knowledge gaps and operational 
needs. The requisite objectives are neither exclusive nor subjective toward 
a specific end-state. Rather, they serve as a starting point, according to the 
aforementioned three tiers of analysis. It will best serve the quality and 
rigor of the analysis to make every effort to personally interview the 
population in their own environment. This approach will reduce bias and 
contextual influence that interviewing on a base or other NATO-enforced 
complex will provide.  
The collection and dissemination process of field data is never 
static. To maintain a comprehensive picture of operational environment, 
collection procedures must constantly be employed. The optimal scenario 
is full attachment and integration, which begins at the brigade level under 
the purview of a general. The general has full control of the social scientist 
and his or her team. The critical component is providing the brigade with a 
constant flow of relevant information and following the Commander’s 
Critical Information Requirements. From the Brigade, the team will 
embed with a platoon, generally at a combat outpost. The relevance and 
quality of the work will rely on the working relationship and respect of the 
Platoon. A key component to this is having current military or ex-military 
personnel on the team with the social scientist. Conflicting cultural 
nuances between the military and civilians can be brokered through this 
component.  
As explained above, the aim of the social scientist is to uncover 
layers of the social dynamics that make up the identity of the community. 
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This is done through a systematic collection plan that digs beneath casual 
observation. Generalizing this plan is difficult, and considerations must be 
given to the location in which it is being implemented. An example of a 
plan follows, including the initial questions that were used in Afghanistan. 
 
 
Discussion Questions  
1. If the social scientist clashes with the forces he or she is 
embedded with, what might the consequences be? What might 
influence how seriously a SME’s recommendations are taken? 
What would be the consequences of that? 
2. Is an outside professional always required to figure out 
such things as the social structure and a community’s needs? If so, 
why? If not, how else could this be done? 
3. If a proposed development plan is identified as low priority 
or likely to cause conflict in the community, what should happen? 
What relationship should there be between an occupying military 
force and the international development community? 
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VI. Social Science Operational Schedule (CONOP) 
 
A. Schedule 
 The following is a systematic schedule that was employed in 
Afghanistan by social scientists in Kandahar and Kapisa provinces. The 
process is broken down into a six-week actionable program that concludes 
with Command and staff briefings. Ultimately, these briefings resulted in 
recommendations for moving forward in the same AO or moving into 
other AOs as designated by military or civilian leadership. This particular 
operation took approximately six weeks to complete. Variations in 
operation procedures are dependent upon a myriad of factors and thus not 
bound to set timelines. The following is simply an example of one such 
schedule implemented over a 12-month period in Afghanistan.  
The process usually begins by meeting with the general and his 
staff to capture a picture of the AO, requisite Commander’s Critical 
Information Requirements (CCIRs), and the operational timeline. From 
that point, the team takes about a week to develop a pre-baseline 
assessment. Phase One focuses on data capture from the general’s staff, 
identifying knowledge gaps, engagement strategies, operational challenges 
in the field, and expectations. Analysts review intelligence material to 
paint a clear kinetic and non-kinetic picture of the AO. Data is 
consolidated with CCIRs, Company and Platoon Leaders Stability 
Operations Aide-Memoires and Societal IPB’s to identify knowledge 
gaps. Analytical efforts conclude with a comprehensive research plan that 
outlines implied objectives. Phase Two includes pre-mission preparations, 
coordination with field entities, and all tactical/support requirements. 
Phase Three, lasting at least three weeks, is spent in the field. Effort is 
concentrated on conducting original field research designed to answer all 
socio-cultural CCIRs. Finally, Phase Four concludes the concept of 
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operation with analysis and dissemination of all captured data. Information 
is consolidated and presented through Command and staff briefings.  
B. Example of a Mission Conducted in Afghanistan 
The following timetable was developed for a mission in March 2010 in 
Bazaar’e Panjwai (Kandahar Province).  
1) Concept of Operation (CONOP) 
i) Phase 1: 30 March – 1 April  
(a) Data capture from TFK, AF-IV, DCGS, CIDNE, and 
KPRT 
(b) Analyze consolidated data and build baseline 
assessment 
(c) Use CCIRs, “Company and Platoon Leaders Stability 
Operations Aide-Memoire” and “Societal IPB” to 
identify knowledge gaps and create research plan 
(d) Pre-mission prep and research 
ii) Phase 2: 2 April – 18 April 
(a) Conduct original, specific field research designed to 
answer socio-cultural CCIRs 
iii) Phase 3: 19 April – 25 April 
(a) Analysis, production and dissemination 
(b) Command and staff briefs 
(c) Way Ahead 
2) Implementation  
i) Three social scientists spent 21 days in Bazaar-e Panjwai 
ii) 32 foot patrols in the community 
iii) Held shuras with local community leaders 
iv) Occupant interviews at vehicle checkpoints  
v) Conducted over 50 individual interviews 
vi) Surveyed local businesses and mosques 
vii) Held interviews on base 




i) Social Groups  
ii) Community Power Study  
iii) Hierarchy of Needs  
4) Commander’s Guidance? 
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VII. Annexes  
Annex A: Collection Objectives  
 
The intent of pursuing data on the following will provide a baseline 
assessment that will grow and develop according to knowledge gaps and 
operational needs. The requisite objectives are neither exclusive nor 
subjective toward a specific end-state. Rather, they serve as a starting 
point according to the aforementioned three-tiers of analysis. It will best 
serve the quality and rigor of the analysis to make every effort to 
personally interview the following in their own environment. This 
approach will reduce bias and contextual influence that interviewing on a 
base or other NATO-enforced complex will provide.  
 
 Mosques  
 Obtain or update grid coordinates on all major mosques and sub-
mosques with picture 
 Identify tribal affiliation to mosques  
 Identify associated elders to mosques and or persons of influence 
 Determine if and how mosques generate revenue 
◦ Populace (tithes)? 
◦ External factors? 
◦ Wealthy beneficiaries?  




 Basic biometrics (Get Picture) 
◦ Name 
◦ Age 
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◦ Tribal Affiliation  
◦ Spoken Language & Dialect  
◦ Place of Birth 
◦ Education 
▪ Location? 
 Determine who the most influential Mullah or Imam is in Tagab.  
◦ Is there a hierarchy? 
◦ How is the Mullah appointed or recruited? 
◦ What relationship do they have with the community? 
◦ Is there conflict between Mullahs? 
 Ideology? 
 Congregation size (competition) 
 Money? 
◦ Does the community approach the Mullah or Elder when they 
are faced with problems? 
◦ How can the Mullah effect change in the community? 
 
Business & Commerce (Excluding Agriculture) 
 Get grid coordinates and picture on all businesses in Tagab 
 What do they sell? 
 Where do the goods come from? 
 What specific products are in demand? 
 What are the major impediments of growth in the specific 
business? 
 How many customers do they get every week/month? 
 What are the busiest days of the week and why? 
 Where do customers come from? 
 What is their average monthly profit? 
◦ What is the most lucrative month or months of the year? 
 Who are their major competitors? 
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 Do they have to give a certain percentage of their income to 
anyone? Insurgents, government officials, etc? 
 
Business Owners 




◦ Birth Location 
◦ Education 
◦ Spoken Language 
 What mosque they attend? 
 Who they trust in Tagab and why? 
 What are the major factors of conflict in Tagab? 
 Who is the most influential business person in Tagab and why? 
 How can business improve in Tagab? 
 Perceptions of ANA/ANP/RMT? 
 
Second Layer Leadership 
 Mirro (Water Distributor) ultimately it is going to be very 
difficult to approach every farmer. The Mirro acts as a conduit to 
the farming community and can be an excellent resource. 
◦ Basic Biometrics 
◦ How he come to his position (elected, appointed, etc)? 
◦ How water is “fairly” allocated? 
◦ Does he have a list of all major landowners? 
◦ Who is the most influential landowner/farmer in Tagab? 
◦ How can Tagab expand its agricultural market? 
◦ Where do agricultural products go after harvest? 
◦ What is the most lucrative agricultural product in Tagab and 
why? 




◦ Basic Biometrics 
◦ Where they teach? 
◦ Subject(s), syllabus, teaching materials/resources? 
◦ Where were they educated? In what subject? To what level?  
◦ How many hours do students stay in school? 
◦ How old are oldest/youngest students? 
◦ How many students are taught? 
◦ Is education a problem in Tagab? If so why? 
◦ What are possible impediments toward comprehensive 
education in Tagab? 
◦ How do insurgents effect education in Tagab? 
◦ What resources are needed to improve the educational system? 
◦ Should women be educated? Why? 
◦ What is the difference between a Madrassa and a traditional 
school? 
◦ Do traditional schools have a positive or negative influence? 
Do Madrassa's have a positive or negative influence? 
◦ Does the community or insurgency react differently to a 
Madrassa then a traditional school? 
 Doctors 
◦ Basic Biometrics  
◦ Where were they educated? Do they have any specialties? 
What is their highest level of education? 
◦ How many clinics operate in Tagab? 
◦ How many doctors are in Tagab? 
◦ Does the insurgency impact how the doctors operate? If so, 
how? 
◦ What are the major illnesses of the populace? Why? 
◦ How can NATO work with “you” to improve health care in 
Tagab? 
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◦ Are clinics run by the government? 
◦ Do private clinics operate in Tagab? 
◦ Where do pharmaceuticals come from? 
◦ Can the populace afford the cost of pharmaceuticals? 
◦ Does tribalism or other social factors effect who doctors or 
clinics choose to support or help? 
 Elders 
◦ Obtain biometrics on all Elders 
◦ Try to identify layers of Elder leadership including Mosque 
affiliation, spheres of influence, insurgent connections, political 
affiliations, etc 
◦ How does an Elder obtain a seat of power at Shuras or other 
decision making gatherings? 
◦ How are Elders viewed by the populace? 
 
 
Baseline Engagement (Broader Picture)  
 
1. Protect the Population. 
o What are the influences on the population in Tagab and how 
can the negative influences be defeated, and the positive 
influences be enhanced, to extend the influence of NATO and 
the Afghan Government? 
 Who are the key formal and informal leaders? 
 Who are the second- and third-tier formal and informal 
leaders? 
 How do the formal and informal leaders interact / cooperate 
/ compete with one another? In what arenas? What are the 
foundations for this cooperation / competition? 
 How do the religious, social, political, and economic 
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leaders interact / cooperate / compete? 
 Which leader(s) would the populace most likely go to and 
for which issues? 
 What does the populace identify as their hierarchy of 
needs? 
 What are the primary / secondary / tertiary social, political, 
and economic groups within the community and how do 
they interact? 
 How does Tagab connect with the rest of Kapisa? With the 
rest of Afghanistan? With neighboring countries? 
 How does the population feel about their formal and 
informal leaders? Who is seen as effective / ineffective and 
why? 
 How well does the populace believe NATO/Afghan central 
government is doing? 
 Who resolves conflict? At what level and between whom? 
Whose decisions are binding? Why? 
 
2. Separate the Insurgent. 
o Where is the insurgent finding sanctuary and how and from 
whence is he supplied and sustained? How can we disrupt this 
to separate the insurgent from the population? 
 Which individuals / groups support the insurgency and 
why? 
 Which individuals / groups resist the insurgency and why? 
 How strong does the insurgency appear to the populace? 
How strong do ISAF appear to the populace? What factors 
play into these perceptions? 
 How is the network of insurgent support in Tagab 
connected with other areas in Kapisa? With other areas in 
Afghanistan? With neighboring countries? 
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 What services / functions does the insurgency provide to 
the population? Where are the gaps in NATO/Afghan 
government services and regional functions? 
 What kinds of support (intelligence, resources, safe haven, 
transportation, weapons, fighters, etc.) do the different parts 
of Tagab provide – if any – to the insurgency and why? 
 
3. Freedom of Movement. 
o What is preventing freedom of movement for Afghans on the 
key highways and how can these impediments be removed? 
 Are there any roads that the populace cannot use? Which 
ones are they? Why are they unavailable? 
 How does the populace work around closed roadways? 
 Are there any particular groups / individuals that the 
populace goes to in order to use certain roadways? 
 How does the populace resolve transportation issues? 
 Which roadways are most important to the populace and 
why? 
 How does the population know that a road is closed or off-
limits? 
 Who does the population believe is most responsible for 
transportation issues and closures? 
 How is the Tagab transportation network interconnected 
with the rest of Kapisa? With the rest of Afghanistan? 
 
4. Mission Protection. 
o How will the insurgency attack our cohesion and seek to 
separate us from the people and their Government (local, 
regional, national)? How can we defeat that threat? 
 What is the insurgency’s information operations campaign? 
 What does it focus on? 
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 How effective is it in effecting a change in the 
population’s behavior? 
 How successfully has it penetrated the Tagab area? 
 What methods are employed to disseminate their 
message? 
 What actors within the community actively re-broadcast 
or otherwise disseminate the insurgents’ message? 
How? 
 What are the key elements of the NATO/Afghan 
government I/O campaign? 
 How effective is it in effecting a change in the 
population’s behavior? 
 How successfully has it penetrated the Tagab area? 
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